Separate and Unequal: School District Financing by Dormont, David
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 6
1993
Separate and Unequal: School District Financing
David Dormont
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
David Dormont, Separate and Unequal: School District Financing, 11 Law & Ineq. 261 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol11/iss1/6
Separate and Unequal: School District Financing
David Dormont*
Every child in America needs an excellent education -
because global competition demands a highly skilled and
knowledgeable work force, because democracy in the modern
era depends on a thoughtful and well-educated citizenry, and
because knowledge and a love of learning are among the most
precious gifts society can give to children. ...
In recent decades, as work and daily life in the United
States have become more complex and demanding, education
has become a prerequisite for economic self-sufficiency, per-
sonal growth and developmen and responsible citizenship. As
a nation, we look to schools to teach not only basic skills and
knowledge, but a more sophisticated way of thinking, commu-
nicating, and solving problems. We also expect schools to cul-
tivate in students an understanding of the arts and
humanities and to instill in young people an appreciation of
the nation's heritage and democratic principles. Finally, we
increasingly rely on schools to ensure that young people have
the life skills and attitudes necessary for success in the work-
place. These benefits can no longer be limited to a well-edu-
cated elite. They are absolute necessities for every American.
- The National Commission on Children1
* B.A. 1984, University of Pennsylvania; M.S., Education 1984, University of
Pennsylvania, Graduate School of Education; J.D., magna cum laude, 1992, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School. David Dormont is currently a law clerk for Judge
Marvin Katz, United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The
author would like to thank Professor Barry C. Feld of the University of Minnesota
Law School for his support in producing this article. The opinions expressed in this
article are solely those of the author and do not represent those of the court.
1. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAmILImS 177-78 (1991) [hereinafter BEYOND RHETO-
Ric]. Congress established the National Commission on Children. The President,
the President pro tempore of the U.S. Senate, and the Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives appointed the thirty-four members on the commission. d at i.
The commission membership included representation from government, education,
labor unions, the medical community and children's rights organizations. Senator
John D. Rockefeller IV chaired this bipartisan commission. Id at iii. Other promi-
nent members of the commission included Bill Clinton, then Governor of Arkansas
and currently President of the United States; Marian Wright Edelman, President of
the Children's Defense Fund; and Bill Honig, Superintendent of Public Instruction
for California I&
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Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find
any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected
- United States Supreme Court2
I. Introduction
The quality of education that America's children receive is es-
sential to the continued viability of the United States as a world
leader.3 Unfortunately, many view the country's educational sys-
tem as a system in decay.4 One of the major problems with our
educational system is the lack of equal educational opportunity
across the country. A factor that directly influences the quality of
educational opportunity is the level of financial support available
to the nation's public schools.5 This level varies greatly from one
school district to the next. As more and more school districts face
budget cuts, school programs are being slashed.6 These cuts have
2. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
3. In comparison with other countries around the world, the United States' ed-
ucational performance ranked 9th in physics, 10th in arithmetic, 11th in chemistry,
12th in algebra, 16th in geometry, and last in biology. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra
note 1, at 179 (citing INTERNATIONAL ASS'N FOR THE EVALUATION OF EDUC.
ACHIEVEMENT, THE UNDERACHIEVING CURRICULUM: ASSESSING U.S. SCHOOL MATH-
EMATICS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 14-29 (1987); INTERNATIONAL ASS'N
FOR THE EALUATION OF EDUC. ACHIEVEMENT, SCIENCE ACHiEVEMENT IN SEVEN-
TEEN COUNTRIES: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 25-43 (1988)).
4. In the 1980's, the National Commission on Excellence in Education stated
that the national educational system put the nation "at risk" and that the system
"threatens our very future as a Nation and a people." NATIONAL COMM'N ON EX-
CELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK 5 (1983). In one of the commission's more
memorable passages it stated that "[i]f an unfriendly foreign power had attempted
to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that existed today, we
might well have viewed it as an act of war." Id.
5. See infra part II.A.; cf. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford
County, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Ark. 1983) ("[Property] wealth is what primarily dictates
the amount of revenue each district receives and the quality of education in that
district."). In response to public pressure for higher educational standards, many
states are changing their funding policies. For example, Kentucky now requires
minimum per pupil expenditures in public schools. See BEYOND RHETORIC, supra
note 1, at 206. Minnesota established minimum spending level requirements for all
of its school districts in 1957. Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 22
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), certification and request granted,
No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May 1, 1992).
6. The media has reported deep budget cuts in school districts throughout the
country. See, e.g., St Paul School Board: Mixing New, Familiar, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis), Oct. 20, 1991, at 26A; Wichita: Real Numbers Bring $6M for Schools,
Daily Report Card, Feb. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Daily Report
Card File; Tentative Agreement Averts Chicago School Strike, UPI, Nov. 17, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; A Warranty for Graduates?, Los AN-
GELES TIMES, Nov. 8, 1991, at B6, col. 3.; John Hildebrand, Schools "Scared Silly'"
It's Budget Time, and the Spending is Far from Easy, NEWSDAY (Long Island, NY),
May 5, 1991, at 7 (Nassau and Suffolk ed.); Brian McGrory, School Funds Sub-
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not been universal or uniform.7 In many cases budget cutting has
exacerbated traditional inequalities in school resources.8
America's system for financing public education fails to pro-
vide equal educational opportunity 9 for its children, even for chil-
dren living in the same county. Large variations in school district
property wealth 0 have created inequities in the ability of a poorer
district to raise school funds and provide educational programs.11
In an age of budget cutting, richer districts are better able to retain
existing programs,' 2 while poorer districts must cut back programs
for their children. In many places around the country, the educa-
tracted; Woes Add Up, Tim BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2,1991, at 25; Rene Sanchez, D.C.
Schools Upbraided for $20,000 Meeting at Va. Resort, THE WASHINGTON POST, June
7, 1990, at D5.
7. For example, in New Hampshire, budget cuts have forced 73 of the state's
162 school districts to eliminate kindergarten programs. William Celis, Furor in
New Hampshire on Vote to Cut Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1992, at B7, col. 1.
When the state eliminates the mandate of educational programs, the richer districts
within the state can afford to maintain them, while poorer districts are more likely
to drop them. See id.
8. When states make across-the-board cuts in educational funding, wealthy dis-
tricts may be forced to cut off "extra fat." However, financially strapped districts
facing similar curtailments must cut off the meat of educational programs. Cf id.
9. Equal educational opportunity is impossible to define, because there is no
consensus as to what it means. See John E. McDermott & Stephen P. Klein, The
Cost-Quality Debate in School Finance Litigationm Do Dollars Make a Difference, 38
LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBs. 415, 416 (1974). This is because educational concepts are
not static, rather they evolve and change over time. See id. at 416 n.6. Many stan-
dards have been used to measure educational opportunity including equal dollars
per pupil; dollars adjusted for pupil needs; variations from the norm; inputs; and
outputs. Id at 416.
This article will simply define the term to mean that children in a given school
district are given roughly the same conditions and possibility to learn as those same
children would have if they were in a different school district. On a more practical
level, this standard translates into equivalent school facilities, student-teacher ra-
tios, curricula, extra-curricular activities, equipment and supplies, libraries, and
levels of experienced faculty. This standard approaches the one suggested by Jus-
tice Marshall in his Rodriguez dissent: "the question of discrimination in educa-
tional quality must be deemed to be an objective one that looks to what the State
provides its children, not to what the children are able to do with what they re-
ceive." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 84 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); see also Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 207 (Ky.
1989). This article suggests a standard of equal educational opportunity based on
equivalence and not on absolute equality from district to district. To suggest such a
standard based on absolute equality would ignore the real variations and needs of
different districts. See McDermott & Klein, supra 9, at 417; see also JAMES COLE-
MAN, EQUALITY AND AcHIEVEMENT IN EDUCATION 138 (1990).
10. School district property wealth is normally measured by totalling the as-
sessed value of the real property within the district.
11. See infra part I.C.2. Poorer small districts may also suffer forced consider-
ation. See Susan R. Stockdale, School Consideration and Minnesota's Fire Safety
Inspection Law: A Step Too Far, 11 LAw & INEQ. 117 (1992).
12. Richer districts also benefit from federal tax policy that subsidizes property
tax payments. See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 55 (1991).
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tional opportunities a child receives are based solely on the neigh-
borhood in which the child's parents choose to live.
Recognizing the great inequalities caused by budget cuts and
by unequal funding of education, many parents and school districts
are now in court challenging the constitutionality of their state's
school funding schemes.' 3 Because the 1973 United States
Supreme Court decision San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez14 precludes a remedy based on the United States
Constitution,15 these challenges must succeed, if at all, on state
grounds. These new challenges assert that under state law every
child has a right to equality of educational opportunity. Plaintiffs
seek school district funding equalization in order to assure equality
of educational opportunity.
This article explores the law governing school funding. Part
II shows that per pupil funding levels affect educational opportuni-
ties and resources. Part II then shows that the historical evolution
of state and federal funding schemes have created inequalities of
educational opportunity for children living in property-poor dis-
tricts. Part II concludes that the U.S. Constitution does not pro-
vide a remedy for children disadvantaged by funding inequities.
Part III shows that several states have interpreted their state con-
stitutions to provide this needed remedy. In particular, these
states often interpret the Education Clauses of their state constitu-
tions which have no parallel in the U.S. Constitution. Part III
then examines the pending case, Skeen v. Minnesota,16 and con-
cludes that the present Minnesota school funding scheme fails to
meet the "general and uniform" and "thorough and efficient" re-
quirements of the Minnesota Constitution's Education Clause.
Part III also concludes that Minnesota's school funding scheme vi-
olates the Minnesota Equal Protection Clauses. Part III then con-
cludes that concern for maintaining local control cannot support
Minnesota's school finance scheme. Finally, Part IV proposes two
solutions to remedy inequalities in school district financing.
H. Financing Education
Much of the present debate in American public education re-
volves around money. To understand this debate, it is important
to understand the evolution of the present educational system and
13. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
14. 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
15. See infra part II.D.
16. Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright County
Dec. 17, 1991), certTation and request granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May 1, 1992).
[Vol. 11:261
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the financial system that supports it. While many Americans may
assume that their children have a right to state-supported free
public education, it is not a fundamental right protected by the
United States Constitution,17 nor has education always been a
state-supported institution.'8 The present educational system and
its support have evolved over the past two centuries.
A. Does Money Matter?
The legal debate on school financing begins with the ques-
tion: does money matter? Per-pupil education spending differs
radically from school district to school district across the country.
Differences arise not only between states, but even in school dis-
tricts located in the same counties. 19 An important question is
whether changes in per pupil spending would make any difference
in students' opportunities to learn (inputs) or in their academic
performance (outputs).
Education scholars disagree on the difference money makes
in education. James Coleman argues that most school factors play
a relatively minor role in determining student outputs. 20 Coleman
notes that some teacher characteristics can have more than a mi-
nor effect;21 teacher characteristics can vary with differences in
funding. A recent Brookings Institute study found that differences
in the economic resources of schools relate to average academic
performance.22 This study noted that while over half of all "high
performance schools" had economic resources that were above av-
erage, only thirty percent of "low performance schools" did.23
There is a "conventional wisdom" that money makes a differ-
ence in education 24 and this notion is a fundamental premise driv-
17. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
18. See infra part H.C.1.
19. See Kozo, supra note 12, at 236-37; Ben Yagoda, What Makes a Great
School Great, PHILADELPHIA, Sept. 1992, at 92-93. New York City spent $7,299 per
pupil in the 1989-90 school year. KozoL, supra note 12, at 236-37. By contrast in
the same year some neighboring suburban school districts spent almost double that
amount. Id (Great Neck - $15,594, Manhasset - $15,084). In that same year, how-
ever, while Chicago spent $5,265 per pupil, Camden, New Jersey spent only $3,538
per student. Id. at 236.
20. COLEMAN, supra note 9, at 149-50.
21. Id.
22. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKE=S, AND AMERICA'S
ScHooLs 102-04 (1990).
23. Id. The study found that money is the key difference in determining stu-
dent-teacher ratios in schools. Id The study found that high performance schools
have about two fewer students per teacher, 13.8 to 1 as compared to 15.7 to 1. Id. at
103. The study deemed this difference "fairly substantial." Id
24. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 406 (N.J. 1990). Kozol quotes a doctor who
works in the South Bronx as follows:
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ing educational decision making.2 5 Some courts have also assumed
that the "amount of money spent on a student's education has a
real and meaningful impact on the educational opportunity offered
that student."26 As two Minnesota courts conclude, if greater re-
sources do not produce better results, high spending wealthy
school districts have wasted a large amount of taxpayer money.27
While money will not solve all problems,28 it can change the
inputs and improve performance.2 9 Specifically, increased finan-
cial allocations to school districts can provide more extensive cur-
ricula, better technological equipment, libraries and facilities,
lower student-teacher ratios, and can attract and retain exper-
ienced faculty.30 Finally, even assuming money does not make a
difference in educational outputs, it does not follow that a state
can, consistent with state constitutional provisions, allow a poorer
school district to receive fewer dollars for education.31
You could also argue, I suppose, that children at expensive high
schools do not really profit from their access to so many books, so
many foreign languages, so many high-paid teachers, and even suffer
from exposure to so many guidance counselors. We have the right to
raise our eyebrows, nonetheless, when 'overutilization' by the very
rich has been permitted to continue at the very time that we are told
to question whether it much matters. If it doesn't matter, cancel it for
everybody. Don't give to them, deny it to us, then ask us to believe
that it is not significant.
KOzOL, supra note 12, at 118.
25. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 406 ("the entire state aid program itself is based on the
assumption that money makes a difference in the quality of education").
26. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989); Du-
pree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford County, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Ark. 1938)
(the amount of money a district receives dictates the quality of education); see also,
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 874 (D. Minn. 1971).
27. Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 193 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright
County Dec. 17 1991), certification and request granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May
1, 1992); Van Dusartz, 334 F. Supp. at 874.
28. See Abbott, 575 A.2d at 403 ("no amount of money may be able to erase the
impact of socioeconomic factors"); McDermott & Klein, supra note 9, at 429 ("a
high expenditure level may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for high
levels of student performance").
29. For example, the government uses funds from Title I of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) to decrease class size for poorer chil-
dren. SOURCEBOOK OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 335-44 (1979) (published
by Marquis Academic Media). According to the National Institute of Education, Ti-
tle I has succeeded in providing additional educational services to students whom
the schools usually serve the least. Id.
30. See Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 393; Skeen, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 144; Abbott,
575 A.2d at 395-97.
31. The Constitution does not tell [students in poorer districts] that since
money will not help, we will give them less; that because their needs
cannot be fully met, they will not be met at all. It does not tell them
they will get the minimum because that is all they can benefit from.
Like other states, we undoubtedly have some "uneducable" students,
but in New Jersey there is no such thing as an uneducable district, not
under our Constitution.
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B. The Rise of Free Public Education
Free public education has a long history in America. In 1779,
Thomas Jefferson proposed a system of publicly controlled schools
for Virginia.3 2 Under this proposal children could attend school 33
free of charge for three years.3 4 The most gifted of these students
ultimately would be educated at William and Mary College for
free.35 Only a modified version of Jefferson's plan ever passed the
Virginia legislature, in 1796.36 Nevertheless, Jefferson's dream of
free public education lived on with land grants to Northwest Terri-
tory states in support of the creation and maintenance of public
schools.37
From the 1830's until after the Civil War, many states had
early, abortive attempts to create free public education systems.
For example, New York created its Board of Regents to supervise
secondary and higher education in 1784,38 but did not succeed in
making all of its public schools free until 1867.39 Despite early
failures, by 1870 over half the children in America were enrolled
in school.40
One education scholar summarized the state of American
public education at the beginning of the 20th century as follows:
At the turn of the century America had reason to be
proud of the educational progress it had made. The dream of
equality of educational opportunity had been partly realized.
Any white American with ability and a willingness to work
could get a good education and even professional training. The
schools were very far from perfect, of course: teachers were in-
Abbott, 575 A.2d at 403.
32. HARRY G. GOOD & JAmEs D. TELLER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION
85 (1973).
33. Early American schools were not age-graded. It was not uncommon to find
children age eight to twenty-five in the same school. See JAMES S. COLEMAN,
YOUTH: TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD 10-20 (1974); JOSEPH F. KENT, RITES OF PAs-
SAGE 18 (1977). Age-grading was a by-product of Horace Mann and the common
schools movement of 1830-50. COLEMAN, supra note 9, at 18.
34. GOOD & TELLER, supra note 32, at 86.
35. Id
36. Id.
37. In 1803, Ohio was the first state to receive federal land grants for public
schools. Id at 158. Later, the admission of 16 states into the Union was conditioned
upon their promise to constitutionally secure the right to education to their citi-
zens. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 863-64 n.5 (W. Va. 1979) (Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming).
38. GOOD & TELLER, supra note 32, at 157.
39. Id at 138.
40. Ross FINNEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL 190




adequately prepared, classrooms were overcrowded, school
buildings and equipment were inadequate, and the education
of [African-Americans] had been neglected. But the basic in-
stitutional framework for a noble conception of education had
been created. Free public schools, from the kindergarten
through the university, had been established.41
The rapid growth of immigration at the beginning of the cen-
tury started to strain public schools.42 After 1900, immigrants en-
tered the United States at a rate of about one million a year.4 3 As
a result of child labor and compulsory school attendance laws, the
children of these immigrants flooded the public schools of Eastern
cities." By the beginning of World War I, almost three-fourths of
all American children attended school.45 At the same time, as ad-
ditional funds were needed to maintain minimal educational stan-
dards, the public had grown suspicious of all public institutions as
"inefficient and wasteful."46
Between 1900 and 1920, financial pressures facing educators
led to the rise of the "efficiency" movement within education.47
This movement adopted the principles of "scientific manage-
ment"48 espoused by Fredrick Taylor.49 Market concepts also took
hold in educational theory.50 Schools that could produce the most
grade promotions for the lowest cost were seen as the most effi-
41. RAYMOND E. CALLAHAN, EDUCATION AND THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY 1 (1962).
42. 1d at 14-15. Not only did the large influx of non-English-speaking children
from diverse backgrounds and semiliterate families strain the physical facilities of
schools, it created new pedagogical problems for an educational system accustomed
to teaching a relatively homogeneous population of children. Id
43. Id- at 14.
44. Id-
45. FINNEY, supra note 40, at 190. (By 1915, 19,707,000 of the 26,000,000 children
between the ages of five and eighteen attended school.)
46. CALLAHAN, supra note 41, at 15.
47. See id. at 46-51. Many critics of the time, convinced that schools were wast-
ing public tax dollars, called for schools to become more efficient or have their
budgets cut. In the summer of 1911, the president of the National Council of Edu-
cation responded by calling for the creation of a committee on "Tests and Standards
of Efficiency of Schools and School Systems." Id. at 54. By the following year prac-
tically every department or division of the annual meeting of the National Educa-
tion Association had at least one speaker or meeting devoted to "efficiency." Id. at
59.
48. Scientific Management is a system which attempts to get the greatest pro-
ductivity out of human efforts. Id at 25. According to the principles of scientific
management, there is only "one best way" of doing anything, and through scientific
study that method could be determined. Id at 29. Through standardization and
giving defined tasks to each worker each day, productivity could be maximized. Id
at 30. In the educational field, this strengthened the use of standardized tests as a
way of measuring educational success. Id at 67.
49. Id at 19-34. Taylor is best remembered for his study of pig iron production.
Id at 34-41.
50. See id at 244.
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cient.15 Schools were modeled after factories.5 2 Under this system
quantity, not quality, was the goal of schools.5 3 Emphasis was on
per pupil costs.54 It was assumed that not every child could suc-
ceed. Educators considered students who had to repeat grades
inefficient.5 5
During this same "efficiency" period, 1900-20, modem con-
cepts of the public school were established.5 6 The standardization
drive of the efficiency movement resulted in relatively uniform ba-
sic school curricula. States passed laws mandating attendance.5 7
The rapid growth of public schooling in this period institutional-
ized school as the dominant feature in the lives of children age five
to eighteen. Finally, the efficiency movement emphasized the reg-
51. Id at 156 ("each system had to be brought in line with the most efficient -
efficient, that is, in terms of costs").
52. Id. at 126-47. Charles Eliot, the president of Harvard University complained
that schools were only used six hours each day and for only half of the days in the
year. He said, "It is obvious at a glance that so partial a use of an industrial plant
would never be thought possible. No productive industry could be successfully car-
ried on with so incomplete a use of an expensive plant." I. at 127 (citing N.E.A.
Proceedings 241 (1903)) (emphasis added). Even the shape of many older school
buildings are modeled after factories of the period.
53. Id- at 156. Schools favored eliminating curriculum classes or increasing
class size if this would reduce overall costs. Educators emphasized education at the
lowest cost, not producing the best educated populace. Id. at 244.
54. Id. at 71. Frank Spaulding, a leading educator of the time and the superin-
tendent of Newton, Massachusetts and later of the Minneapolis school districts
(1914-17), emphasized the importance of cost in a speech to educators when he
asked:
Why is a pupil recitation in English costing 7.2 cents in the vocational
school while it costs only 5 cents in the technical school? Is the "voca-
tional" English 44 per cent superior to the "technical" English or 44
per cent more difficult to secure? Why are we paying 80% more in the
vocational than in the technical school for the same unit of instruction
in mathematics? Why does a pupil-recitation in science cost from 55
per cent to 67 per cent more in the Newton High than in either of the
other schools?
Id. at 74.
55. See id. at 165-69. Teacher efficiency was measured by the rate of student
promotion. Id. at 168. Nevertheless, with the wide range of educational opportuni-
ties open to unskilled workers before World War 1I, the lack of educational profi-
ciency possessed by students leaving or dropping out of public schools did not pose
a problem to the U.S. economy. In 1900, only 6.4 percent of 17 year olds had gradu-
ated high school. COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 26. By 1940, this number reached
50.8%. Id. As for college education, just over 4% of the eighteen to twenty-one
year olds were in college in 1900, and by 1940 this figure had reached 15.68%. Id.
In contrast, it is predicted that by the year 2000, a college education will be a pre-
requisite for between one-third and two-thirds of all new jobs. BEYOND RaETORIC,
supra note 1, at 181 (citations omitted).
56. See KENT, supra note 33, at 235. Beginning in the early 1900's, the market-
place looked to a school diploma as the device to certify young people as skilled for
work. COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 25.
57. By 1917, 38 states required compulsory school attendance beyond age 14.
COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 24.
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ular use of standardized tests as a measure of the quality of
education.S8
C. Funding Public School Education
To educate the large number of children attending public
schools, districts looked to three major sources for funding: state
governments, local governments, and the federal government.
1. State Funding
State education funding has become increasingly important in
this century. Traditionally, funding for public schools was derived
principally from local sources.5 9 In 1915, seven states provided no
state tax dollars to public schools,60 six states provided over forty
percent of school funding,6 1 and one state provided over fifty per-
cent.62 The remaining states fell in between.63 After World War I,
58. Many comparisons of schooling in the United States are normatively based
(i.e., graded in comparison to average). See McDermott & Klein, supra note 9, at
427 ("test scores of children or school districts are compared with the scores of a
national or state sample of normative or typical student population"). One of the
problems with most achievement tests is that they do not aim to measure the over-
all effectiveness of a school's educational program, but rather seek to measure par-
ticular skill areas. See id. at 425-26. School districts which choose not to emphasize
the subject matter tested on standardized tests have a distinct disadvantage in
norm-based achievement. See id.
Normative comparisons lead to the conclusion that for every good school there
must be a bad school. Not all school systems can be like Lake Woebegone's, where
"all the children are above average." Though Minnesota has the '%est" graduation
rate in the nation, there is some state with the "worst" graduation rate. See Skeen
v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 25 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright County Dec. 17,
1991), certification and request granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May 1, 1992) (90.9%
graduation rate for Minnesota compared to a national average of 75%). This com-
parison fails to address the issue of what is an acceptable rate of graduation, or
whether a state like Minnesota falls within a range of acceptable rates. Only by
adopting an approach to educational performance which measures success against a
baseline set of goals would it be possible for all American schools to be "good
schools."
59. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc., DI-
GEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1990, at 147 (1991) [hereinafter DIGEST OF EDUCA-
TION STATISTICS 1990]. Through the beginning of the Depression, local funds
accounted for more than 80% of all funds spent on public school education.
Through World War II, local funds still represented two-thirds of all funds spent.
Id.
60. FINNEY, supra, note 40, at 214 (citing U.S. Bureau of Education Report,
1917, p. 79). The seven states that provided no state tax funds were all located west
of the Mississippi. They were Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Oregon, South
Dakota, and Wyoming. Id. However, it also should be noted that Massachusetts
provided only one percent of its local schools budgets. Id.
61. Id. These six states were Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi,
and New Jersey.
62. Id. Montana provided 50,85%.
63. Minnesota's mix was 82.23% from county and local taxes, and 10.79% from
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83.2 percent of all school funds came from local sources;4 remain-
ing funds came almost exclusively from the states.65 By 1961,
before the Great Society program, 56.9 percent of all school funds
were local.66 State funds represented 38.7 percent of all school
funds and federal funds represented 4.3 percent.6 7 Significant re-
gional and state variations still existed. While states like Nebraska
were almost wholly dependent on local funds,68 others, like Dela-
ware, had less than twenty percent of education funds come from
local sources.6 9
Throughout this century, the funding mix has slowly moved
from total dependence on local funding toward greater reliance on
state funds. Only by the mid-1970's did non-local sources provide
more than half of all school funds.70 In the last twenty years,
however, there has been relatively little change in education fund-
ing mixes. State sources represent 49.5% of funds today, and local
sources provide 44.1%.71
Dependance on local as opposed to state funds still varies
greatly from state to state.72 For example, the state of New Hamp-
shire provides only 7.6 percent of its school funds and local sources
account for 89.1 percent;73 in Hawaii, almost all non-federal dollars
spent on education come from the state.74 Minnesota is in the
middle, with the state providing 55.8 percent of school funds75 and
local sources provide 39.9.76
2. Local Funding
Nationally, almost 90% of all local funding comes from prop-
state taxes. The remaining funds came from other sources such as permanent
funds. I&
64. DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1990, suprm note 59, at 147.
65. Id. State funds amounted to 16.5 percent of school district budgets. Federal
funds amounted to only 0.3 percent of revenues.
66. I&
67. I&
68. G. CREssmAN & H. BENDA, PUBUC EDUCATION IN AMERICA 88-89 (1966).
86.9% of Nebraska school funds derived from local sources and only 5.9% of funds
came from the state.
69. Id
70. DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1990, supra note 59, at 147. The first year
local funds represented less than 50 percent of all school funds was 1974-75. In
1987-88, local funds still comprised 44.1% of all funds spent.
71. Id. at 147.
72. See id.
73. Id- at 148.
74. I& In Hawaii, 86.7% of all education funds come from the state, and 13.2%
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erty taxes.7 7 Two-thirds of all local funds are raised through di-
rect taxation;vs the rest is raised through indirect taxation by local
governments.7 9 However, through regulation of local boards - in
particular the taxing authority of these boards - state govern-
ments maintain ultimate control over their available local
funding.8O
Large variations in property wealth8l can create income dis-
parities between districts.8 2 For example, in 1989, the poorest dis-
trict in Texas had $20,000 of property wealth per student and the
richest district had over $14,000,000 of property wealth s 3 This re-
flects a difference of 700 to 1,84 resulting in spending ranging from
$2,112 to $19,333 per student.8 5 Another consequence of property
wealth differences is that property owners in wealthier districts
often pay taxes at a lower rate than in poorer districts though they
raise more per pupil.8 6 Finally, property owners in rich districts
derive a greater benefit from federal tax policies which make
property taxes a deduction; this benefit further eases the fund-
raising ability of wealthier districts.87
77. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, REVENUES AND EXPENDrrURES FOR
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, 1977-78, at 13 (1981) (nationally,
89.4% of all local revenues come from local property taxes). This is the last year
for which records are available.
78. CENSUS OF Gov MNT (1987), 4 GOvERNMENT FINANCES, I FINANCES OF
PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS 16 (1990) (30.2% of all funds spent on education are raised
through direct local taxation). In many states, however, the funds are not raised
directly by local school boards (ex. Massachusetts and Virginia). Instead, in these
states the local municipality is responsible for raising funds through its general tax-
ation power. See id.
79. This is accomplished through a number of different methods throughout
the country including allocations from general local government taxation and sales
taxes.
80. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990); see also, Melby v. Hellie,
80 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Minn. 1957) ("Our Constitution has vested in the legislature
plenary power as to the manner of establishing a system of schools."). By authoriz-
ing local governments to raise revenues, the state governments control the sources,
amounts, and uses to which these funds may be put.
81. School district property wealth is normally measured by totalling the as-
sessed value of the real property within the district.
82. See KozoL, supra note 12, at 55.
83. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989).
84. Id-
85. Id.
86. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1973).
87. Because the property tax is counted as a tax deduction by the federal
government, home-owners in a wealthy suburb get back a substantial
portion of the money that they spend to fund their children's schools
- effectively a federal subsidy for an unequal education. Home own-
ers in poor districts get this subsidy as well, but, because their total tax
is less, the subsidy is less.
KozoL, supra note 12, at 55. The overall value of this subsidy is substantial. In
1984, for example, the federal government granted $9 billion in property tax deduc-
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Minnesota has large differences in per pupil property wealth.
Adjusted tax capacity8 8 per pupil ranges from $1,226 in the Bertha-
Hewitt district to $30,639 per pupil in Becker.8 9 This difference be-
tween districts has been increasing over time.9o
3. Federal Funding
The federal contribution to educational budgets varies widely
by state. For example, federal funds provide only 3.3 percent of
New Hampshire's public school revenues, but they represent 13.2
percent of Hawaiian school funds.91 The federal government pro-
vides 4.2 percent of Minnesota school funds.92 Minnesota is 45th in
the rank of federal funds to states.93
There are many reasons for the disparities in federal funding
as a function of the percentage of the total funds spent in a state.
First, the more funds that state and local governments provide for
education, the smaller the federal percentage share will be. Sec-
ond, federal programs allocate funds to states differently. The fed-
eral government has a large variety of programs to assist
education. Some of these programs give aid directly to the states.94
These programs may require that each state receive a minimum
dollar allocation.9 5 Other aid can be applied for by individual
school districts.96 The allocation of funds in these programs may
tions and an additional $23 billion in mortgage-interest deductions to homeowners.
1d. (citing OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FEDERAL PROPERTY-TAx AND
MORTGATE-INTEREST DEDUCTIONS AND FEDERAL GRANTs TO LOCAL SCHOOLS
(1986)). In contrast, the federal government granted local school districts only $7
billion in aid. KOZOL, supra, note 12, at 55.
88. Property tax levels are determined by state law and levied by local units of
government. An assessor decides the market value of property and applies the ap-
propriate tax capacity percentage to determine the "tax capacity." Tax capacity
was formerly referred to as "assessed value." Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954,
slip op. at 13 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), certiication and re-
quest granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May 1, 1992).
89. Id. at 30.
90. Id, at 31 (between the 1983-84 school year and the 1988-89 school year there
was a 28% increase in the variation of tax bases between richer and poorer districts
in the state).
91. DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1990, supra note 59, at 148.
92. Id.
93. Id. Data for Virginia is not reported.
94. See BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOvERNmENT FISCAL YEAR 1993 app.
one 425-31 (1992) [hereinafter BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 1993]. The type of state aid
programs are varied (for example: general state block grants; grants to support
state education agencies; and grants to states to combat drug abuse).
95. Id. at app. one 425.
96. See id. at app. one 425-31. Examples of programs that local school boards
can apply for include assistance for establishing magnet schools, for capital ex-
penses, and programs aimed at certain groups like immigrants or Native American
children.
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depend on the character of the school district's population,97 or on
the type of program the school district hopes to implement.98
Even when examining a single federal program, no two states re-
ceive identical allocation per student.
Today, federal funding is diminishing after peaking in the
Carter years at almost ten percent of all revenues spent on public
education.9 9 Since that time it has declined to a point less than
two-thirds of its highest level.'00 The present funding level is the
lowest since before the Great Society Program in the mid-Six-
ties.101 This retreat in funding by the federal government comes
at a time of increasing demands to provide more student serv-
ices.10 2 Increased demand coupled with decreasing federal support
exacerbates local districts' financial problems.
D. Education as a Fundamental Right Under the Federal
Constitution
Inequities in property taxes and the distribution of state
funds for public education in Texas prompted one parent, Deme-
trio Rodriguez, to file a class action suit in the summer of 1968.103
This case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court.104
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,0 5 the
Court held that variations in school district resources due to differ-
ing property values did not rate constitutional protection. 0 This
97. See, e.g., id. at app. one 428 (funding based on school age-population); How
a State or Local Education Agency Obtains Funds, 34 C.F.R. § 298.7 (1991) (funding
allocations based on the concentration of low-income families).
98. E.g., BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 1993, supra note 94, at app. one 428 (programs to
create magnet schools or prevent dropouts).
99. DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1990, supra note 59, at 147 (9.8% was the
exact figure in both the 1978-79 and 1979-80 school years).
100. The present level of federal funding was 6.3% in 1987-88. This is the last
year for which statistics are available. Id.
101. Id. In terms of overall Gross National Product, public school revenues rep-
resented between 4.0 and 4.6 percent in the years 1970 through 1977. See U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., 1 THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 1990, at 168 (1990). However,
from the years 1979 though 1987 (the last year for which figures are available), only
3.5 to 3.6 percent of total GNP was spent on schooling. Id.
102. Besides the additional revenues that schools must spend to educate and as-
similate disabled students into the school community, increased costs are also asso-
ciated with problems of society as a whole. For example, the public schools are
faced with educating a growing number of children born to drug-addicted mothers,
schools must create new educational programs to deal with AIDS education, and,
finally, schools must deal with educating homeless children. All of these special
needs require increased expenditures.
103. PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONviCrbONs 283 (1988).
104. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6 (1973).
105. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
106. Rodriguez was a 5-4 decision. The majority summarized its findings as
follows:
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ruling forced future plaintiffs alleging unequal educational oppor-
tunity into state court. 07
Three of Demetrio Rodriguez' four sons attended the
Edgewood Elementary School.108 The school building was deterio-
rating, its classrooms lacked basic supplies, and almost half of its
teachers were uncertified and teaching with emergency permits.1o9
Ninety percent of the school district population was Mexican-
American; the majority of the remainder was African-Ameri-
can." 0 In contrast, the nearby Alamo Heights District's school
population was only 18 percent Mexican-American and less than
one percent African-American."'
The Edgewood School District had the highest property tax
assessment rate in the San Antonio metropolitan area - $1.05 per
$100 of assessed property."i 2 Despite this high rate of taxation, it
could raise only $26 per pupil."3 In contrast, Alamo Heights
raised $333 per pupil with a property tax rate of only $.85 per $100
of assessed property value."14 In addition, the state's educational
assistance program, designed to equalize school district expendi-
ture levels," 5 actually contributed more money to Alamo Heights
then to Edgewood." 6
The Court held that differences based on wealth did not raise
a significant constitutional question." 7 First it concluded that
[To the extent that the Texas system of school financing results in
unequal expenditures between children who happen to reside in dif-
ferent districts, we cannot say that such disparities are the product of a
system that is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory ... The
constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether
the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state pur-
pose or interest. We hold that the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this
standard.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54-55 (citation omitted). Justice Stewart joined the majority
opinion and judgment despite believing that the Texas system created an educa-
tional system that was "chaotic and unjust." Id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring).
107. Despite the ruling in Rodriguez, the battle over the constitutionality of edu-
cational funding in Texas continued in state courts. Eventually, the Texas Supreme
Court ruled that the state's finance scheme violated the Texas State Constitution.
See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
108. IRONS, supra note 103, at 283.
109. Id.
110. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12.
111. Id. at 12-13.
112. Id. at 12.
113. Id. The average assessed property value per pupil was only $5,960.
114. Id. at 13. The average assessed property value exceeded $49,000 per pupil.
115. Id at 10.
116. Id. at 12-13. The state contributed $222 per pupil in Edgewood, but $225 per
pupil in Alamo Heights. Id. Federal funding assistance in contrast supplied $108
per pupil in Edgewood, but contributed only $36 per pupil to Alamo Heights. Id.
117. Id. at 23-24 ("at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause
does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages"). The Court went
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wealth is not a suspect class and therefore the Texas educational
financing system did not operate to the disadvantage of a suspect
class.11S Next, the Court held that education was not a fundamen-
tal right.119 Because it is not a fundamental right, o2 0 "strict scru-
tiny" did not apply.121 Finally, the Court concluded that the Texas
financing system passed "rational basis" review because it fur-
thered legitimate, articulated state purposes and therefore it did
not constitute invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22
M. State Approaches to School Financing
Because Rodriguez precludes a federal constitutional remedy,
unequal school funding has become a state concern. In contrast to
the Federal Constitution every state constitution mentions educa-
tion in some way. 2 3 Many states define education as a fundamen-
on to state that no system can assure "equal quality of education except in the most
relative sense." Id. at 24.
118. See id at 18-29.
119. Id. at 35.
120. See id at 35-37. The Court explained its holding as follows:
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protec-
tion under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for say-
ing it is implicitly so protected. As we have said, the undisputed
importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from
the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and economic
legislation.
Id. at 35.
121. See id. at 37-44. Strict scrutiny is the standard of review for fundamental
rights. See J. NowAX, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW § 11.7 (1986).
The "strict scrutiny" standard requires the government to prove that it has a com-
pelling government interest to uphold the challenged law. Id. at § 11.4. In the ab-
sence of a compelling government interest, either a rational basis test or an
intermediate test applies to challenged government action. Id.
122. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 47-55. The Court summarized its holding by stat-
ing that "to the extent that the Texas system of school financing results in unequal
expenditures between children who happen to reside in different districts, we can-
not say that such disparities are the product of a system that is so irrational as to be
invidiously discriminatory." Id. at 54-55.
123. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 865 & n.10 (W.Va. 1979). Some state consti-
tutions say that public schools may or shall be established, while others require the
legislature to provide for public school systems of a particular quality. Id. at 865.
For example, the Michigan Constitution provides that "[r]eligion, morality and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." MIcH. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1 (emphasis added). The Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[t]he legis-
lature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be
as nearly uniform as practicable." WIs. CONST. article X, § 3 (emphasis added). In
contrast, the Minnesota Constitution provides that "it is the duty of the legislature
to establish a general and uniform system of public schools." MINN. CONST. art.
XII, § 1 (emphasis added). It also requires that the system be "thorough and effi-
cient." Id
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tal right.=4 These rulings depend on an analysis of the provision's
language and history of state constitutional conventions.125
The majority of states are grappling with the constitutionality
of their school financing schemes. Fifteen state appellate courts
have upheld the constitutionality of their school financing sys-
tems, 2 6 and eleven have declared their state's systems un-
constitutional.J27 Law suits are pending in nineteen other
124. See Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1976) ("in Connecticut, ele-
mentary and secondary education is a fundamental right"); Rose v. Council For
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) ("A child's right to an adequate
education is a fundamental one under our Constitution."); Skeen v. Minnesota, No.
C788-1954, slip op. at 145 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), certtfwa-
tion and request granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May 1, 1992) ("Education is a funda-
mental right under the Minnesota Constitution."); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,
878 (W.Va. 1979) ("education is a fundamental constitutional right in this State");
Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989) (" 'equal opportunity for educa-
tion' is a fundamental right").
Montana found that its constitution "guaranteed equality of educational oppor-
tunity" and ruled that its finance system violated the state constitution without
reaching the question of whether education is a fundamental right. Helena Ele-
mentary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 689-91 (Mont. 1989).
But see, East Jackson Schools v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984) ("Education is not a fundamental right under Michigan's Constitution.").
125. See, ag., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393-98 (Tex.
1989); Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 161-68 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright
County Dec. 17, 1991), certkAfiation and request granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May
1, 1992); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 574-78 (Wis. 1989).
126. Arizona, see Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973).
Colorado, see Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo.
1982).
Georgia, see McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 (Ga. 1981).
Idaho, see Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 636 (Idaho 1975).
Illinois, see People of I1. ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976).
Maryland, see Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 780
(Md. 1983).
Michigan, see Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711. 721 (Mich. 1973).
New York, see Board of Educ. Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist,
439 N.E.2d 359, 361 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
Ohio, see Board of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of Cincinnati v. Walter, 390
N.E.2d 813, 822 (Ohio 1979).
Oklahoma, see Fair Sch. Finance Council of Okla., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d
1135, 1137 (Okla. 1987).
Oregon, see Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 149 (Or. 1976).
Pennsylvania,see Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (Pa. 1979).
South Carolina, see Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.C.
1988).
Tennessee, see Tennessee Small Sch. Systems v. McWherter, 1992 WL 119824
(Tenn. App. June 5, 1992) (reversing a district court partial final declaratory judg-
ment finding the Tennessee system unconstitutional).
Wisconsin, see Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 570-85, (Wis. 1989), rehg de-
nied, 443 N.W.2d 314 (1989).
127. In addition to the district court decision in Minnesota, Skeen v. Minnesota,
No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 147-48 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), cer-
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states,1 28 including several which are hearing constitutional chal-
lenges for a second time.
The Minnesota school finance scheme provides a good exam-
ple of the battle over school financing. 2 9  Skeen v. Minne-
tification and request granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May 1, 1992), the following
state appellate courts have ruled that their funding schemes are unconstitutional:
Arkansas, see Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford County, 651
S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ark. 1983) (affirming trial court's finding that the state's financing
system violated that state's constitutional provisions requiring equal protection and
those requiring the establishment of "a general, suitable and efficient system of ed-
ucation.").
California, see Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 958 (Cal. 1977), cert. denied and
opinion supplemented by 569 P.2d 1303 (1977).
Connecticut, see Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1976) ("the state
system of financing public elementary and secondary education as it presently ex-
ists and operates cannot pass the test of 'strict judicial scrutiny' as to its constitu-
tionality").
Kentucky, see Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186,215 (Ky. 1989).
Montana, see Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690
(Mont. 1989) ("spending disparities among the State's school districts translate into
a denial of equality of educational opportunity" in violation of the Montana Consti-
tution).
New Jersey, see Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 563 (N.J. 1990); Robinson v.
Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297-98 (N.J. 1973).
Texas, see Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Kirby 1), 777 S.W.2d, 391, 398
(Tex. 1989) ("the school financing system violates the Texas Constitution's 'effi-
ciency' provision"). See also Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Kirby II), 804
S.W.2d 491, 492-93 (Tex. 1991) (holding that the Texas school financing system still
violates the state constitution despite legislative modification following Kirby I).
Washington, see Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 7 of King County v. State, 585 P.2d 71,
85-104 (Wash. 1978).
West Virginia, see Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W.Va. 1979) ("Because
education is a fundamental constitutional right in this State, then, under our equal
protection guarantees any discriminatory classification found in the educational fi-
nancing system cannot stand unless the State can demonstrate some compelling
State interest to justify the unequal classification.") (citations omitted).
Wyoming, see Washakie Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 315 (Wyo. 1980),
cert. denied, Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Washakie County Sch. Dist.
No One, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
128. The states with pending law suits are: Alabama, Alaska, California, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Pennsylvania. Skeen v. Minnesota,
No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 152 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright County Dec. 17, 1991) certifi-
cation and request granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May 1, 1992). In addition, suits
are also pending presently in New Hampshire, Fox Butterfield, In New Hamp-
shire, Needy Schools Test a Tradition Little State Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1992, at
Al, col. 1, and New Jersey, Joseph F. Sullivan, Fight on Trenton Aid to Poor School
Districts Goes to Court Again, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1992, at B8, col. 1. The New
Jersey Supreme Court had previously declared the state system unconstituional, see
supra note 127 and accompanying text.
129. One fact that distinguishes the Minnesota suit from similar suits in other
states is the fact that the largest inner-city metropolitan school districts, Minneapo-
lis, St. Paul and Duluth, did not enter the suit on either side. Skeen, No. C7-88-
1954, slip op. at 8-9. In addition, almost no small rural school districts entered the
suit on either side. Id. at 9. The plaintiffs in this case represented 52 school dis-
tricts generally located in the outer-ring suburbs and/or rural areas. These districts
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sota L30 is a case of first impression in Minnesota 3 ' In December,
1991, after a lengthy trial, a district court judge declared the Min-
nesota scheme unconstitutional.132 Specifically, the court found
that the "referendum levy,'l3 supplemental revenue'34 and debt
service levy' 35 components of the Minnesota school finance sys-
tem" violate the equal protection guarantees 36 and the Education
Clause of the Minnesota Constitution.137
comprise approximately one-quarter of all kindergarten through twelfth grade stu-
dents in the state. 1d. at 5-6. Twenty-four school districts entered the case as in-
tervenor defendants. These districts are generally located in the "inner-ring and
second tier suburbs," and represent approximately 17% of kindergarten through
twelfth grade enrollment. Id.
While suits in other states tend to have racial overtones as a background con-
cern (generally minority inner-city districts versus white suburban districts), in
Skeen, the absence of the more racially and ethnically diverse city school districts
as litigants removes this backdrop. The Minnesota litigation is one purely of local
property wealth and the legal consequences that such differences make.
130. No. C7-88-1954, slip op. (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), certi-
Jlcation and request granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May 1, 1992).
131. In 1971, the Minnesota system of financing public elementary and secondary
education was found to violate the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp.
870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971). The court found that:
The level of spending for publicly financed education in Minnesota is
profoundly affected by the wealth of each school district. Children liv-
ing in districts poorer than the richest are proportionately
disadvantaged.
Id. at 873. The court made its holding based on a finding that the state's system of
financing was a form of wealth discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. at 874-86. While Van Dusartz has never been explicitly overruled or re-
versed, the United States Supreme Court in its Rodriguez decision would seem to
control and implicitly overrule the decision. See discussion supra part H.D.
132. Skceen, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 145. The trial before Judge Gary J. Meyer
lasted 67 days, and involved the testimony of 35 witnesses and over 450 exhibits. Id.
at 1. Judge Meyer's opinion itself spans 211 pages.
133. A referendum levy supplements a district's general operating fund. Id. at
19. In 1957, the Minnesota legislature established minimum spending levels for all
school districts in the state. Id. at 22. This "foundation level" of support was based
on both state and local taxes. Id. Later in 1971, the legislature ended a school
board's authority to raise operating funds in excess of the state formula without
voter approval (a referendum levy). Id. at 23.
134. Supplemental revenue is designed to insure that no district receives a reduc-
tion in general education revenues from one year to the next due to changes in the
state legislature's allocation formulas. Id. at 18.
135. The debt service levy is used to repay bond indebtedness incurred in con-
nection with the construction of buildings and other facilities. Id. at 19.
136. Id. at 147-48. The Skeen court found violations of the equal protection guar-
antees of Article I, section 2 and Article XI, section 1. Article I, section 2 of the
Minnesota Constitution states that:
No member of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of
the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the
law of the land or the judgment of his peers.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2.
137. Article XIII, section 1 reads:
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly
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As in other states the district court's decision in Skeen was
not the end of the battle, but marked the first shot in a long war.
The case is currently on appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
If the court upholds the district court's decision, the battle will
shift to the state legislature. After the legislature acts, the liti-
gants will likely return to the courts to test the constitutionality of
the new financing system. 38
1. The Facts in Skeen
This article will assume the facts as found by the district
judge.13 9 The court's first major finding was that, compared to
other schools nationwide, Minnesota schools "on balance are very
good."'140 The court also found that the poorer school districts
"meet or exceed all educational requirements established by the
state."141 The court found, however, that "[c]hildren in very small
school districts have an educational disadvantage over children in
larger school districts."142
The court also found that property wealth differences be-
tween districts created disparities in the quality of education Min-
upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to
establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The legisla-
ture shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure
a thorough and efficient system of public schools throughout the state.
MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
138. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Kirby 1), 777 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Kirby II), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.
1991). Kirby is the continuation of Rodriguez in the Texas state court system. In
New Jersey the battle has long raged in the court system: see Abbott v. Burke (Ab-
bott II), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J.
1985), and Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v.
Cahill (Robinson V), 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV),
351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973)
cert. denied sub nom Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). A third suit continu-
ing the earlier litigation (Abbott v. Burke) was recently filed in New Jersey. Sulli-
van, supra note 128, at B8, col. 1.
139. This assumption is consistent with the appellate standard of review in Min-
nesota. See Schweich v. Ziegler, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 722, 729 (Minn. 1990) ('"The scope
of review in a case tried by the court without a jury is limited to determining
whether the court's findings are clearly erroneous and whether it erred in its con-
clusions of law.").
The Skeen court made 409 separate finding of facts. These findings stretched
over 140 pages, and are summarized in four and a half pages. Skeen v. Minnesota,
No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 1-145 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), certi-
fication and request granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May 1, 1992).
140. Id. at 141. In fact, Minnesota's high school graduation rate is the highest in
the nation (90.9%). Id. at 25. Minnesota's rate compares to a national average of
only 75%. Id.
141. Id. at 141.
142. Id. at 142.
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nesota children received.143 Greater revenues allowed wealthier
districts to provide greater educational resources, and these
greater resources "produced greater educational effectiveness and
educational opportunity."'144 Specifically, the court found that
these wealth disparities created significant differences in pupil-
staff ratios1 45 and that these ratios "contribute significantly to the
education received by Minnesota children." 46 The differences
were so great that certain poorer school districts would require
over 100 additional staff members to have the same pupil-staff ra-
tios as the wealthier school districts.147 The court also found sig-
nificant differences in the staffs' experience, development, and
salaries.148 Finally the court found wealthier districts had advan-
tages in curricula, summer schools, advanced placement programs,
gifted and talented programs, access to computers, and extracurric-
ular activities.149 These advantages furnished students in wealth-
ier districts with a "superior education."150 The court concluded
that property wealth disparities "placed children in low wealth dis-
tricts at an unequal footing with children in high wealth
districts."151
The court found wide variations in property wealth per pupil
between school districts.152 For example, Elk River and
Edina, two school districts of approximately equal size in
the greater Twin Cities metropolitan area, 53 have tax capaci-
143. See id. at 144.
144. Id at 193 (citing a study by Dr. Van E. Mueller, a professor in the Depart-
ment of Education Policy and Administration at the University of Minnesota).
145. Id. at 144. Pupil to professional staff ratios vary from 13.8:1 in St. Anthony-
New Brighton to 17.2:1 in Rosemount. Id at 103-05.
146. Id at 144.
147. Id at 103-05. In fact, Rosemount (17.2:1) would need 108 new staff members
to bring its pupil/staff ratio equal to that of Bloomington (15.6:1).
148. Id. at 144.
149. Id Other states have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Edgewood In-
dep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Tex. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575
A.2d 359, 395-97 (N.J. 1990).
150. Skeen, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 93 (increased input variables "contribute
to the high wealth districts' furnishing a superior education to Minnesota students
than low wealth districts."). The Skeen court did realize that greater resources "do
not always and invariably produce superior opportunity for children, since re-
sources must be wisely employed to produce effective results." Id at 95. Based on a
study by Dr. Van E. Mueller, a professor in the Department of Education Policy
and Administration at the University of Minnesota, however, the court found that
high wealth districts provide "greater educational opportunity" than low wealth
districts. Id at 96.
151. Id at 144.
152. Id- at 141. The Minnesota data of school district wealth disparity is compa-
rable with that from other states. See, e.g., Abbott, 575 A.2d at 388.
153. Skeen, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 113 (in 1990-91 Elk River had 6,973 stu-
dents and Edina had 6,436).
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tieslm per pupil of $2,395 and $10,879, respectively. 5 These differ-
ences resulted in operating expenses of $3,066 per pupil in Elk
River compared with $4,448 per pupil in Edina,'5 6 a difference of
$1,382, or 45%.157 This translated into differences in staff ratios,
programs for the gifted, summer schools, libraries, counseling serv-
ices, building cleanliness and even school accreditation.158
The Skeen court concluded that property-wealth variations
created significant inequalities between districts which were not
the result of "tax effort" by the districts, but were a "function of
wealth."159 Specifically, court found that the referendum levy160
was "an inefficient and non-uniform use of revenue" as it related
to students in very small districts.16 ' The court concluded that
"Minnesota's school finance system has created an unconstitu-
tional wealth-based classification in its effect on certain school
districts."162
2. The Issues
The Minnesota Constitution has a section dedicated specifi-
cally to education. This provides:
The stability of a republican form of government depending
mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the
legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public
schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by taxa-
tion or otherwise as will secure a thorough and effwient sys-
tem of public schools throughout the state.163
Interpreting the state constitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has held that the state legislature possesses "almost unlimited
154. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (defining tax capacity).
155. Skeen, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 66-67.
156. Id at 118. In addition, while Elk River had debt service of $370 per pupil,
Edina had no debt service. Id
157. Id.
158. See id- at 113-16. Two of Elk River's schools lost their North Central Asso-
ciation accreditation, at least in part due to the consequences of insufficient fund-
ing. Id at 115. Specific faults related to money included oversized kindergarten
classes, insufficient library hours, and a lack of adequate administrators given the
schools' sizes. Id.
159. Id at 141. In Minnesota, this wealth based difference has affected schooling
for at least the past 20 years. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 873 (D.
Minn. 1971) ("The level of spending for publicly financed education in Minnesota is
profoundly affected by the wealth of each school district. Children living in dis-
tricts poorer than the richest district are proportionately disadvantaged.").
160. School districts use the referendum levy to supplement their general oper-
ating funds. Skeen, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 19.
161. Id. at 142.
162. Id.
163. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
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power over all matters relating to public schools."164 Therefore, in
Minnesota the maintenance of public schools is a matter of state,
not local, concern.165
The two key phrases in the Education Clause require estab-
lishment of both a "general and uniform system of public schools"
and a system that is "thorough and efficient." 6 6 To find the
meaning of these phrases, other state appellate courts have turned
to dictionaries, constitutional conventions and each other for
guidance.167
3. The Court's Analysis
After dealing with preliminary questions of standing,168 the
court constructed the meaning of the Education Clause.169 The
court first examined the "general and uniform" clause. Looking at
the original constitutional debates, the court concluded that the
clause "was to assure that both the rural, city and township areas
were to receive equal benefits."1 7 0 The court found that Minne-
sota courts have not interpreted this clause to require absolute uni-
formity.17 1 It defined the state's duty to create uniform schools to
include a "duty to assure equal access to resources for similarly sit-
uated school districts."172 The court held that the school financing
system violated the Education Clause of the Minnesota
164. See Board of Educ. v. Houghton, 233 N.W. 834, 835 (Minn. 1930).
165. Id.
166. See MINN. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 1.
167. See, eg., Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 159-72 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), certkfication and request granted, No. C5-92-677
(Minn. May 1, 1992); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 874-77 (W. Va. 1979).
168. See Skeen, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 158-161. The court addressed both the
validity of the standing of the plaintiff and also whether or not the issue in conten-
tion constituted a political question.
169. Id. at 161-72.
170. Id. at 164. The Skeen court cited an interesting statement from the Repub-
lican debate over the state constitution which addressed the very issue now being
debated again.
In one town say the school section is worth $100 per acre. That would
be a great fund for that town. In another town adjoining, it may so
happen that the school section is worth but the government price -
$1.25 per acre. Now those towns may be just as populous, and every-
one admits that education is not a local, but a general benefit. It is the
benefit of our county that the children of another county should be ed-
ucated. Now I submit if that would be just? One county might have a
revenue of $50,000, while another would have a small revenue of
$2,000. I ask if that is just and equitable.
Id. at 163 (quoting DEBATEs AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION FOR THE TERRITORY OF mNNESOTA 242 (T. Andrews ed. 1858)).
171. Id. at 160 (citing Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1, 6 (1878)).




The court then conducted an equal protection analysis.174
The court first held that education was a fundamental right' 75
under the Minnesota Constitution.176 The court then examined
the relationship between wealth and equal protection.177 The
court found that the Minnesota Constitution's provision for "uni-
form" schools supported a finding that wealth is a suspect class.
The court found that Minnesota's finance system is not uniform
and discriminates among school districts based on wealth. Finally,
it concluded that the Minnesota Constitution does not recognize lo-
cal control of schools and that the maintenance of public schools is
a state concern.1 78
The court rejected a constitutional standard that would mean
"minimal adequacy for some children and exceptional instruction
for others."179 Rather, the state was required to establish a system
that was "equally effective for all children."1 80a Finally, it held
that constitutional uniformity must be measured by inputs or re-
sources1 81 available and not by outcomes achieved.18 2
4. Analyzing the Skeen opinion with reference to other
states
Because Skeen is a case of first impression it is useful to ana-
lyze the issue with reference to the other states as well as preexist-
ing Minnesota state law.
a. General and Uniform
The Minnesota Constitution's "general and uniform" clause
173. Id at 172.
174. Id at 172-88.
175. I& at 175-83.
176. Id at 172-73 ('This Court holds that the Minnesota Constitution, Equal Pro-
tection Clause, Article I, Section 2, and the Education Clause, Article XIII, Section
1, guarantee its citizens a fundamental right to an education, and that the Minne-
sota Constitution thereby provides for broader guarantees than the federal consti-
tution in the area or education.").
177. Id- at 183-85.
178. Id. at 185-86.
179. I& at 192.
180. Id at 192.
181. Id at 192. By inputs or resources, the court meant teachers, textbooks, fa-
cilities and curricula.
182. See id at 192-95. An outcome-based system would measure equal opportu-
nity by measuring student performance in terms of standardized tests. Id at 194.
The court stated that "[r]educing the sum of outputs to the accomplishment of a
few achievement tests would also be grossly unfair to educators and pupils, for edu-
cation must extend far beyond the limits of verbal facility and mathematical profi-
ciency." Id at 195 (citing Miliken v. Green, 212 N.W. 711, 716 (Mich. 1973)).
[Vol. 11:261
SCHOOL DISTRICT FINANCING
requires that the legislature establish schools and that there be
some parity between these schools.183 As interpreted, this parity
does not rise to the level of cloned replication. For example, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that school districts need not
have identical text books.s 4 Still, the legislature could require
this type of uniformity by using its plenary power over schools. 8 5
Several other state courts have defined the requirements of a
system of uniform education.' 86 Five other states have clauses in
their constitutions requiring the establishment of a "general and
uniform" system of public schools.187 Of these, only the North
Carolina Constitution's "general and uniform" provision specifi-
cally requires that "equal opportunities" be provided to all stu-
dents. 8 8 The Kentucky Supreme Court defined uniformity in
terms of inputs, when it required that every district have a "sub-
stantially uniform system and equal facilities." 8 9
b. Thorough and Effwient
Minnesota's educational system should be examined against
the goals of the state constitution's authors to determine whether
it is constitutionally "thorough and efficient".190 The creators of
the Minnesota Constitution thought the stability of a "republican
form of government"191 was dependent "upon the intelligence of
the people,"192 which was to be maintained by "a general and uni-
form system of public schools."' 9 3
Seven other states also have "thorough and efficient" clauses
in their state constitutions.194 West Virginia defines a "thorough
183. MINN. CONST. art. XIH, § 1 ("it is the duty of the legislature to establish a
general and uniform system of public schools") (emphasis added).
184. Cf. Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1, 4 (1878).
185. See Melby v. Hellie, 80 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Minn. 1957) ("Our Constitution has
vested the legislature with plenary power as to the manner of establishing a system
of schools.") (citing Board of Educ. v. Erickson, 295 N.W. 302 (Minn. 1940)).
186. See, e.g., Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 574-78 (Wis. 1989); Rose v. Coun-
cil for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 207 (Ky. 1989).
187. See, ARiz. CoNsT. art. XI, § 1; IND. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1; N.C. CoNsT. art. IX,
§ 2; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
188. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
189. See Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 207 (Ky. 1989)
(quoting Wooley v. Spalding, 293 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Ky. 1956)).
190. See Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 165-66 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), cert fzcation and request granted, No. C5-92-677
(Minn. May 1, 1992).
191. MINN. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1.
192. Id
193. Id.
194. See MD. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; Omo
CONST. art. VI, § 2; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 15; W. VA.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
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and efficient" system as one that develops "the minds, bodies and
social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and happy
occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economi-
cally."195 New Jersey also defines "thorough and efficient" in
terms of citizenship qualifications and the ability to obtain gainful
employment,196 noting that this required that "something more"
be added to the education in poorer districts.1 97 The New Jersey
Supreme Court defined the word "thorough" to include "complete-
ness and attention to detail."198 The court held that a thorough
education must provide more than an adequate or minimal
education.199
Some states define the term efficient in terms of equality.
The Kentucky Constitution requires that the legislature "provide
for an efficient system of common schools."200 The Kentucky
Supreme court interpreted this provision to require that schools be
"efficient, equal and substantially uniform."201 The Texas
Supreme Court held that an efficient system has to distribute edu-
cation funds "equitably and evenly."202
c. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of a state's constitution may re-
quire an educational system of equivalent funding per pupil.
Equal protection requires that a state distribute government bene-
fits rationally and fairly.203 Interpreting its own Equal Protection
Clause, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
For some districts to supply the barest necessities and others
to have programs generously endowed does not meet the re-
quirements of the constitution. Bare and minimal sufficiency
does not translate into equal educational opportunity. 'Equal
protection is not addressed to minimal sufficiency but rather
to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action.'20 4
195. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
196. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990).
197. Id.
198. Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 875.
199. Id.
200. See Ky. CONST. § 183.
201. See Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 208 (Ky. 1989).
202. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989).
203. See McDermott & Klein, supra note 9, at 432 ("Under the equal protection
clause, the concern is whether government treats people equally, not with making
people equal and not with equality of results emanating from a distributed benefit,
for the latter may be beyond the capacity and power of governments and schools to
control.").
204. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford County, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93
(Ark. 1983) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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In Serrano v. Priest 205, the California Supreme Court deter-
mined that a funding scheme that "makes the quality of a child's
education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors" is
a form of invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the California Constitution.206 Other courts have
echoed the sentiment in Serrano. The Arkansas Supreme Court
stated that "the educational opportunity of the children in this
state should not be controlled by the fortuitous circumstances of
residence.... Such a system only promotes greater opportunity for
the advantaged while diminishing the opportunities for the disad-
vantaged."2 07 The Kentucky Supreme Court held that schools
must afford "equal opportunity for all,"20 8 and explained that
"although by accident of birth and residence, a student lives in a
poor, financially deprived area, he or she is still entitled to the
same educational opportunities that those children in the wealth-
ier districts obtain."209 Finally, the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that
Each child, every child, in this Commonwealth must be pro-
vided with an equal opportunity to have an adequate educa-
tion. Equality is the key word here. The children of the poor
and the children of the rich, the children who live in the poor
districts and the children who live in the rich districts must be
given the same opportunity and access to an adequate educa-
tion. This obligation cannot be shifted to local counties and lo-
cal school districts. 2 1 0
An equal protection analysis raises the issue of how to define
"equality" with respect to education.211 A system requiring abso-
lute per pupil dollar allocations ignores differences in costs and
needs between districts.212 Furthermore, equal dollar allocations
for each school district does not translate to equal educational op-
portunity for the children in those districts.213 Therefore, an
205. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
206. Id at 1241.
207. Dupree, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
208. Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 207 (Ky. 1989) (em-
phasis in the original).
209. Id.
210. Id at 211 (emphasis in the original). The Rose court then went on to define
seven goals that an efficient system of education must provide to each child. Id at
212.
211. "Equity, after all, does not mean simply equal funding. Equal funding for
unequal needs is not equality." KOzOL, supra note 12, at 54.
212. McDermott & Klein, supra note 9, at 417.
213. James Coleman concluded that equal dollar inputs into schools does not
mean that the inputs received by the children in those schools are equal. COLEMAN,
supra note 9, at 138. Coleman illustrated his point:
[A] school board can spend identical amounts on textbooks in two dif-
ferent schools (or two school boards can spend identical amounts in
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"equal" funding system must address differences in needs due to
varying school populations and conditions.214
d. What About Local Control
The loss of local control is one of the most frequently noted
concerns regarding modification in the use of property taxes as a
base for funding local education. For example, though it saw edu-
cation as a fundamental right, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Kukor v. Grover215 focused on the importance of local control of
education under the Wisconsin Constitution216 and adopted the
Rodriguez rational basis approach for its analysis. 2 17 The court did
not believe that defining equality of educational opportunity as a
fundamental right "mandates absolute equality in districts' per-pu-
pil expenditures." 218 It concluded that the Wisconsin Constitution
prohibited such equalization "to the extent that it would necessar-
two different systems), so that the inputs as disbursed by school
boards are identical. But if the texts depreciate more rapidly, through
loss and lack of care, in one school or one system than the other, then
the text as received by a given child (say the second year after a new
text is issued) constitutes a lesser input of educational resources to
him than if he were in the other school or other system.... As an-
other example, if the expenditures on window glass in a city school in
a lower-class neighborhood and a suburban school were equal, the
child in the city school would spend much of his time in classrooms
with broken windows, while the child in the suburban school would
not.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
214. See Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 197 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), certification and request granted, No. C5-92-677
(Minn. May 1, 1992) ("School districts have special needs and different costs, thus it
is very likely that district spending will vary.").
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in crafting a remedy for its state funding
scheme required that funding must "be adequate to provide for the special educa-
tional needs of these poorer urban districts and address their extreme disadvan-
tages." Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990). Equivalent spending per se
would not meet the New Jersey standard as additional aid may be required "for the
special educational needs of [poorer] districts in order to redress their disadvan-
tages." Id. (emphasis added).
The Texas Supreme Court also concluded that in equalizing funding the state
may recognize differences in the cost of living in given areas or the cost of provid-
ing educational opportunity for disadvantaged students. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989).
215. 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
216. Id. at 580-81 ('"The principle of local control in Wisconsin, therefore, is not
merely a theoretical notion, but rather is a constitutionally based and protected
precept as to which the framers of our constitution were firmly committed."). A
comparison to the Wisconsin Constitution enacted in 1848 is important, as the Min-
nesota Constitution closely resembles it. Skeen, No. C7-88-1954, slip op. at 162 (cit-
ing WILLIAM ANDERSON & ALBERT J. LOBB, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTrruTION OF
MINNESOTA 131 n.46 (1921)).
217. See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 580 (Wis. 1989).
218. Id. at 579.
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ily inhibit local control."2 1 9
Critics argue that the loss of the ability to raise funds from
property taxes would eliminate local school boards' ability to su-
pervise and control the educational systems in their communi-
ties.220 Nevertheless, local control over schools is not necessarily
sacrificed by creating equality in state school financing systems.2 21
Local control over schools in poor districts has been called a
"cruel illusion" due to the inability of those districts to raise
money for their schools.222 The state ultimately controls the
boards' abilities to raise money.2 23 Because of limited tax rolls,
many boards simply cannot tax themselves at the levels necessary
to achieve educational excellence. The California Supreme Court
pointed out that property tax funding rather than promoting fiscal
choice, actually deprived less wealthy districts of options.224 The
Texas Supreme Court elaborated on that principle:
An efficient system does not preclude the ability of communi-
ties to exercise local control over the education of their chil-
dren. It requires only that the funds available for education be
distributed equitably and evenly. An efficient system will ac-
tually allow for more local control, not less. It will provide
property-poor districts with economic alternatives that are not
219. I-
220. See, e.g., Slceen, No. C7-88-1954 slip op. at 185.
Jonathan Kozol argues that the elements under "local control" are far less
than might be expected.
The local board does not control the manufacture of the textbooks
that its students use. It does not govern teacher preparation or certifi-
cation. It does not govern political allegiance. It does not govern the
exams that measure math and reading. It does not govern the exams
that will determine or prohibit university admission. It does not even
really govern architecture....
What the local board does determine is how clean those floors will
be; how well the principal and teachers will be paid; whether the class-
room will be adequately heated; whether a class of 18 children will
have 18 textbooks or whether ... a class of 30 children will be asked to
share the use of 15 books, whether the library is stocked with up-to-
date encyclopedias, computers, novels, poetry, and dictionaries or
whether it's used instead for makeshift classrooms, as in New York
City, whether the auditorium is well equipped for real theatrical pro-
ductions or whether, as in [a nearby suburb], it must be used instead to
house 11 classes, whether the gymnasium is suitable for indoor games
or whether it is used for reading rooms, whether the playground is
equipped with jungle gyms and has green grass for soccer games and
baseball or whether it is a bleak expanse of asphalt studded with
cracked glass.
KozOL, supra note 12, at 212-13.
221. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford County, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93
(Ark. 1983).
222. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano IT), 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976).
223. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990). Many states cap the amount
of property tax rate that can be imposed by local authorities.
224. See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 948.
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now available to them. Only if alternatives are indeed avail-




The Rodriguez decision prevents the federal judiciary from
setting minimum national education standards.226 Therefore, any
attempt to find a national solution to the educational inequalities
must focus on the Congress.
If education is truly a national priority, and not just a subject
for rhetorical argument, then the need for a national educational
policy is clear.22 7 The nation cannot remain competitive if some
states maintain a system of equal opportunity for the next genera-
tion while other states allow gross inequalities. To maintain the
nation's competitive edge, Congress could choose to extend the
right to equality of educational opportunity to all by statute.228
If Congress chooses this method, it should avoid a solution
based on per-pupil expenditure levels. Because of the vast differ-
ences in costs and needs from district to district such an approach
is doomed to fail to resolve the problems of educational inequal-
ity.229 Instead, Congress should seek a solution based on input fac-
tors other than money.230 An input oriented policy would
undoubtedly require greater expenditures in some districts, and
greater state and federal support for those districts.2 31
Congress should mandate a national policy which maintains
local autonomy, yet provides a safety net for children abandoned
by state and local governments. One way to achieve these two
goals would be to mandate maximum student-teacher ratios at dif-
ferent grade levels.23 2 Congress could also guarantee every child
225. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989).
226. See supra part I.D.
227. See BEYOND RHEToRic, supra note 1, at 177-79.
228. NowAx, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, supra note 121, at § 14.45. Such Congressional
action may raise a federalism concern. However, even if such a statute were to
pass, there remains great room for both local control and innovation in schooling.
The proposal set forth below, while arguing for congressionally set input variables,
allows local school boards total freedom choosing both the methodology and sub-
stance of education within schools.
229. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
230. Imposing an input standard would be in line with the earlier cases that
struck down separate-but-equal schools. In those cases, courts used inputs as the
standard of equality in comparing separate schools for African-Americans with fa-
cilities available to whites. See McDermott & Klein, supra note 9, at 420.
231. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
232. In Chapter I programs aimed at helping disadvantaged students, Congress
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the right to a textbook and minimum sanitary conditions in his or
her school. 23 3 Finally, Congress might mandate the availability of
in-school libraries,234 computer instruction, foreign languages, the
arts, music, and sports, and a variety of classes and activities such
as are available at most of the "better" school districts in the coun-
try.23 5 Such changes could insure that every child in the country
would have the opportunity to receive a quality education regard-
less of his or her parents' residences.
B. State Solutions
Until Congress enacts a national policy, state legislatures
should assume the duties of financing local schools.236 As the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court stated:
When a district falls short of the constitutional requirements
whatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the
state's to rectify it. If local government fails, the state govern-
ment must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot
carry the burden, the state must itself meet its continuing
obligation.2 3 7
While a complete shift from local funding from property taxes to
state funding may seem radical, it merely accelerates the historical
trend.23s The state already controls local school districts' ability to
raise funds for education.23 9
The Minnesota Supreme Court should affirm the district
court's decision in Skeen. The Minnesota Constitution's Education
Clause grants an unusually broad guarantee of the right to educa-
has mandated a 25 to 1 ratio. Congress may also seek to mandate a maximum stu-
dent-guidance counselor ratio. The New Jersey Supreme Court has observed that
adequate guidance counseling could provide children in poorer districts with special
assistance and individual attention. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 402 (N.J. 1990).
The Court thought that such counseling services in the schools could help solve
problems associated teen pregnancies, drug abuse and crime. I&
233. See generally KozoL, supra note 12, at 86-87 for examples of where even
these basics are not provided today to every child in public schools.
234. Cf. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 402 (N.J 1990) ("Many students in poorer
urban districts do not have books at home. These students need adequate libraries
and media centers.").
235. See, e.g., KOZOL, supra note 12, at 63-66, 163-65.
236. "[Ihe state, by requiring attendance but refusing to require equity, effec-
tively requires inequality. Compulsory inequality, perpetuated by state law, too fre-
quently condemns our children to unequal lives." Id. at 56.
237. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford County, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95
(Ark. 1983) (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973)).
238. See supra part II.C.1.
239. See Leroy v. Special Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Minneapolis, 172 N.W.2d 764,
768 (Minn. 1969). Over the years, states have moved towards greater regulatory
control of schooling. Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954 slip op. at 21 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), certification and request granted, No. C5-92-677
(Minn. May 1, 1992).
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tion.2 40 It provides for a system that is both "general and uniform"
and "thorough and efficient."24  The Minnesota Constitution
makes it the state's duty to provide education to children. The dis-
trict court found that Minnesota children receive unequal educa-
tional opportunities based upon their parents' residence.24 2 This
inequality can be changed only by modifying the present financing
system.
The Minnesota Equal Protection Clauses also provide
grounds for affirming Skeen. Because education is a state concern
and the Minnesota Constitution confers a duty on the legislature
to provide an education to the state's citizens,243 there must be a
clear and compelling reason for legislation which provides unequal
educational opportunities.24 4 No clear or compelling reason is ap-
parent. The present system cannot be justified as rationally re-
lated to student needs. The inequities in Minnesota education
caused by the variation in property wealth are therefore unconsti-
tutional and cannot remain.
New social and economic circumstances require that the Min-
nesota legislature reexamine school financing. In earlier days
commerce was more locally dependent and employees lived in rel-
atively close proximity to their places of employment.245 The level
of education in one town was not likely to have a large impact on
the economic health of another town. But the health of a state in
a global economy is dependent on the quality of education in local
regions.246 Employers can locate their businesses anywhere in the
world. Employers seeking an educated work force will move to re-
gions where the labor pool is educated. For example, employers
who are deciding to locate a new business in Edina, Minnesota are
likely to base that decision on the educational qualifications of
240. South Dakota is the only other state whose constitution has both "general
and uniform" and "thorough and efficient" education clauses. See S.D. CONST. art.
VIHI, §§ 1 & 5.
241. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
242. See supra part H.C.2.
243. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. See supra note 163-65 and accompanying text.
244. Because education is a fundamental right in Minnesota, see supra note 175
and accompanying text, strict scrutiny is the standard to be applied in determining
the constitutionality of a statute which impinges that right. See supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
245. Skeen v. Minnesota, No. C7-88-1954 slip op. at 166 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Wright
County Dec. 17, 1991), certification and request granted, No. C5-92-677 (Minn. May
1, 1992). ("In the early days of statehood the economy was primarily agricultural.
The children who attended the one room school houses often never left their
communities.").
246. Id. at 166 ("In the 1990's Minnesota must compete on a global level. Exten-
sive education is needed for those who design, manage and sell Minnesota products
abroad, as well as the workers who assemble the product.").
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workers in the Twin Cities area, and not simply on the quality of
Edina's school system. The state's education system should reflect
this change.2 47
The Minnesota legislature should increase the financial re-
sources available to poorer school districts.4 8 An increase in state
taxes may be offset by a decrease in local property tax rates. This
would also decrease the state's annual costs for property tax re-
funds. As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted
We realize our remedy here may fail to achieve the con-
stitutional object, that no amount of money may be able to
erase the impact of the socioeconomic factors that define and
cause these pupils' disadvantage. We realize that perhaps
nothing short of substantial social and economic change affect-
ing housing, employment, child care, taxation, welfare will
make the difference for these students; and that this kind of
change is far beyond the power or responsibility of school dis-
tricts. We have concluded, however, that even if not a cure,
money will help, and that these students are constitutionally
entitled to that help.249
Some districts may be hurt by any redistribution in funding,
but they will be no worse off than they would be had a fair system
of funding always been in place. Against the constitutional man-
dates of "general and uniform," "thorough and efficient" and equal
protection, it is an unacceptable argument that unconstitutionally
advantaged districts will now lose unfair advantages. Activists
must lobby the state legislature for increased funding for all
schools to solve the problems of redistribution. This would allow
all schools to have the funds to do what, until now, only a few,
privileged districts could do.
No school system can make children equal. A good school
system can provide a child with all the resources that child needs
to achieve his or her full potential. While state-provided financing
of education is not the whole answer, equalized funding would en-
sure that all children within a given state have the same opportu-
nity to reach their potential. In a land that boasts of providing
equal opportunity for all, the tragedy of the school financing sys-
tem is not just that children growing up in poorer district will be
247. C. id- (as opposed to earlier times, it is uncertain whether children who
grow up in the small towns of Minnesota will stay in that community when they
grow up).
248. Cf Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990) ("If the claim is that addi-
tional funding will not enable poorer urban districts to satisfy the thorough and ef-
ficient test, the constitutional answer is that they are entitled to pass or fail with at
least the same amount of money as their competitors.").
249. Id
1992]
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less likely to succeed, but that the state failed to provide equal op-
portunities to children in the wealthy and poor districts.
As the United States Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board
of Education,
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.250
250. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
